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Abstract
The Department of Defense (DoD) currently faces a significant problem when it comes to
auditing and tracking financial transactions. The DoD has failed every audit since 2017 although
it is gradually improving its auditable rating year after year. Concurrently, Blockchain is an
emerging technology that has typically been used for cryptocurrencies but has slowly been
adapted by private enterprises for their auditing and invoicing problems. This study investigates
the value proposition of blockchain technology to improve DoD financial tracking and auditing.
To test the hypothesis that blockchain is the optimal option for the DoD, this paper employs an
industry blockchain adoption flowchart, requirements matrix for financial regulations and audit
weaknesses, and a rigorous benchmark comparison chart between the current financial system
and well-established private company’s blockchain (which DoD could replicate). The results of
the flowchart and matrix demonstrate that Permissioned Private Blockchain can track
government transactions in instances where contracts between a government agency and
contractor could be condensed into variables and formulas. The outcome of the comparison
shows that a DoD replicated blockchain system would excel at Latency, Error Rate, Time, but
not Cost Metrics when compared to other established DoD financial accounting systems.
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I. Introduction

Background
The total spending for the United States Military is 773 billion dollars which comes out
to 11% of the total 7 trillion dollars of Federal Spending [1]. Approximately 752 billion dollars
of the 773 billion dollars is discretionary, which means each year a large portion of the military
budget is determined by last year’s transactions. With all these funds changing hands, the US
Government self-audits to make sure that the funds are in accordance with established
regulations. In addition, the transaction data can help create a budget for the following year.
Auditing is the act of systematically verifying all logged and unlogged financial
information. Auditors require documentation for all transactions that happen within an
organization to make an accurate assessment about the audit. Keeping records for the largest
federal agency in the United States is a difficult task. David Norquist, Pentagon’s comptroller,
said “The Pentagon failed its comprehensive audit in fiscal 2020, the third year it has failed since
the first audit was conducted in 2018, reflecting system and accounting problems across its vast
bureaucracy that could persist until 2027” at the earliest [2]. The comptroller also said that no
large-scale fraud is at fault; however, “the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Special Operations,
and the Transportation Command all received failing grades [3]”. In the fiscal year of 2021, the
DoD was unable to bring forth sufficient evidence for auditors to make an opinion, or in auditing
terms, a disclaimer of opinion [4].
Blockchain technology is a distributed ledger which means everyone participating has a
copy of the transactions. If every participant has a copy of the transactions, then the occurrence
of malice or a mistake with a particular user’s transaction can promptly be corrected from
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everyone's ledger. A properly implemented blockchain’s strength is that it's immutable, which
means that it is nearly impossible for any sole person to manipulate data on the distributed
ledger. Blockchain can be completely public, where the ledger is completely open for anyone to
join. However, blockchain can also be private where only approved personnel can be added to
the ledger to read or add to it. Private blockchains are generally used between organizations and
don’t interact with the general public at all. For example, Walmart Canada has been using private
blockchain to keep track of shipping logistics with trucking companies. Walmart Canada
experienced a significant drop in invoice disputes and they claimed that it has increased their
payment speed and accuracy [5]. In November 2021, the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs showed interest in blockchain solutions for specific areas [6]. This displays United States
Government’s general intrigue into this new technology.

Problem Statement
In the fiscal year 2021 report, auditors issued a disclaimer of opinion because the “DoD
reporting entities that account for the majority of the DoD’s balances continued to have
unresolved accounting issues and material weaknesses that prevented them from providing
sufficient and appropriate evidence to support the balances presented on their respective financial
statements [4]”. A detailed review of the material weakness and accounting issues reveals that
the seven problem areas identified in the FY2020 audit report persists in the FY2021 audit
report. For the scope of this thesis, the paper will look at the Information Technology problem
area since the audits recommend the DoD “maintains effective controls to ensure that data flows
between systems correctly and is accurately reported on the DoD’s financial statements [4]”.
There are four key weaknesses in the Information Technology Area: Configuration and Security
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Management, Access Control, Segregation of Duties and Legacy Systems [4]. Some ongoing
solutions to expedite the remediation process include software consolidation and removing
legacy applications. However, the Pentagon’s comptroller expects that none of these solutions
will be done prior to 2027 [2]. With the advance of blockchain technology, this thesis will study
the extent to which blockchain technology can be used by the DoD to fix weaknesses found in
the most recent report of audits.
Research Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to determine the extent to which blockchain
technology can be employed by the DoD to remediate weakness found in the 2021 Fiscal Year
Audit Report.
Investigative Questions
This research will discuss the efficacy of blockchain as a possible solution to the
Information Technology weakness discussed in the FY2021 Audit. This thesis will address three
major questions and a few sub-questions.
● What are the drawbacks of the current DoD financial systems?
○ To what extent does blockchain meet requirements and fix current drawbacks?
● What are DoD financial regulations and current practices?
○ What type of blockchain are most appropriate for current DoD practices? And
why?
○ What type of blockchain transactions is suitable for the DoD?
○ What current systems/policies would need to change to accommodate a
blockchain solution?
3
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● What are some challenges the DoD could face if they were to transition to a blockchain
based solution?
○ What metrics can be used to compare current DoD financial systems with a
possible blockchain application
Methodology
This thesis will apply the decision tree from the “A Ten-Step Decision Path to Determine
When to Use Blockchain Technologies” research paper to find out if blockchain is a viable fit for
an organization. From the conclusion of the flowchart, we will have a better idea whether or not
the DoD financial process, as a whole, is a good candidate for blockchain integration. If one gets
far enough in the flowchart, they can determine which type of blockchain would be logical for
the DoD financial process.
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), any new federal financial
system migration plan should also address “Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of
1996 (FFMIA) requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the United States
Standard General Ledger (USSGL) at the transaction level [7]”. So, any new proposal to the
already existing financial system should follow the same regulations as the original system. This
research will use the definitions of the four financial system weaknesses and the federal
accounting regulations as requirements to test blockchain validity.
The final step of the methodology will cover the performance aspects of blockchain. This
part will include three different financial (two from the DoD and one Real-World Blockchain
Implementation.). This section will also include the key metrics that may be used for
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comparison. The comparison of two vastly different systems (DoD and blockchain systems) is
not within the scope of this paper and should be saved for future works.
Assumptions/Limitations
The GAO, in their report, has outlined many ways to rectify the auditing situation with the
DOD, but for the scope of this paper, we will only be looking at the Information Technology
aspect of the audit weaknesses. One limitation of this thesis was availability of reliable data. This
can be difficult to access data such as classified data or not available to the general public.
Another way data can be difficult to access is when private companies do not share all details of
their intellectual properties because of the fear of copycats in the private industry. Private
companies do not need to report of their failures and only highlight their success. They may even
tend to exaggerate data to win the public’s interest. Finally, there is no one best way to compare
two systems that differ so greatly. For this reason, we will not be comparing metrics between the
systems and should be part of future works.
Implications or Expected Contributions
The purpose of this thesis is to educate the reader to the fundamentals and processes of
blockchain. Secondly, this thesis can be used to convince decision makers to assess blockchain
solutions. Thirdly, this paper aims to push readers to weigh the pros and cons between COTS and
in-house blockchain development.
Preview
The second chapter, Literature Review, will focus on the fundamentals of blockchain
technology and how the DoD operates the financial side. Methodology in the third chapter will
cover the ways this paper will tackle the research objective. This includes a flowchart made for
5
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organizations thinking about incorporating blockchain, a requirements checkbox seeing if
blockchain can abide by the same rules and regulations as the other DoD systems, and finally
performance metrics between the DoD systems to the real-world implementation of blockchain.
The Analysis chapter systematically addresses all the ways mentioned in the methodology
portion with figures, diagrams, and SysML modeling as proof. The Conclusion is the final
chapter that answers each aspect of the investigative questions using the analysis as evidence and
send the reader off with a call to action and a need for future works in this space.
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II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with the base knowledge of
blockchain and the current financial DoD process. For the blockchain portion, the reader will get
comfortable with its attributes, different types, and end-to-end operations. As for the DoD
process part, the paper shall provide examples of hierarchy and flowchart for financial activities.

Blockchain Basics
Blockchain is a distributed peer-to-peer network that has two main qualities:
immutability and decentralization. Blockchains are built utilizing a SHA256 cryptographic hash
algorithm. Whatever block of plaintext is used, from one word to a whole Shakespearean play, it
should return a hash of a fixed length (in this case, 256 bits long). Additionally, the same input
should return the same hash output every time. Even the smallest changes in the input text will
result in a drastic change in the output, so attackers will not be able to see a pattern emerge.
Ideally, the output hashes to be collision-free. Being a collision-free algorithm requires two
different input texts not having the same output hash, which avoids confusion. SHA256 has a
chance, albeit incredibly small probability, of two hashes accidentally colliding. After trying to
brute-force the output hash, it should be difficult to deduce the original input texts. Brute forcing
is using trial-and-error processes repeatedly to get past encryption. Lastly, it should be easy to
scramble input text, but nearly impossible to reverse. The other reason it is immutable is that
blockchain uses public key (asymmetric) cryptography. It is considered asymmetric, because
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there are two keys, one used for encrypting while the other is used for decrypting. If blockchain
uses symmetric cryptography then all a hacker would need is one key meant for encrypting and
decrypting. In this cryptography, “each receiver needs a private key that can be derived from the
shared public key” [8]. The asymmetric method allows the private key to be used as proof of
ownership between two actors in a blockchain transaction. Finally, there are so many new
transactions being added such that it is computationally infeasible to maliciously add a block(s).
Being decentralized means that there is no centralized authority making sure the data
transmitted between everyone is correct. Everyone has a copy of the data table and when a new
transaction is made, everyone’s nodes need to make sure that they have the same data table. This
is done using consensus algorithms. For example, a common cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, uses a
Proof-of-Work algorithm. Proof-of-Work means that miners are brute-forcing to be the first one
to solve a complex math problem. Whoever solves it correctly first adds the new transaction on
the data table. For their efforts, miners are compensated per new transaction they add to the
blockchain. On the other hand, Proof-of-Stake allows the person that has the most to lose to
dictate the data table. A coin-owner offers a portion of their coins as collateral to become a
validator. Once a validator, the coin owner will be able to validate any transactions onto the
blockchain data table. If the data table the validator puts up is incorrect, then they lose their
collateral. The benefits of Proof-of-Stake over Proof-of-Work is that it is more environmentally
friendly, as huge mining (high electricity bills) operations are not needed. However, Proof-ofWork is much more decentralized than Proof-of-Stake as anyone with a computer can add blocks
to the blockchain instead of a select group of individuals.
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Proof-of-Authority is similar to Proof-of Work. Instead of the user staking a coin to add a
block (transaction) to the blockchain, the user stakes their reputation or identity. Users will need
to be vetted before joining the blockchain as the users can read and write blocks on the
blockchain. The vetting process will include confirming their real identity and processing every
potential user equally. Once the vetting process is completed the potential user becomes a
validator. Since there is a team of individuals bringing validators into the fold, it needs to be
addressed that Proof-of-Authority is a semi-decentralized consensus algorithm. Not everyone can
become a validator, so that means a central authority is making a decision to make someone a
validator. However, the central authority does not need to validate every transaction added on the
blockchain, as trust is given to the validators to uphold their duty.
Types of Blockchain
The three major types of blockchain are: permissionless public, permissioned private and
hybrid (permissioned public) according to the authors of “Overview of Blockchain Technology”
[9]. Permissionless public blockchain is by far the most popular one. Since anyone is free to join
and participate in the blockchain network, this makes the blockchain permissionless. As a benefit
of this type of distributed ledger, users can read and write blocks on the public ledger. Trust
within this type of blockchain is “built between peers in the network because they all have to
abide by the established consensus mechanism. [10]”. The most famous consensus algorithms for
permissionless public blockchains are usually Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake. Blocks
(transactions) are added on the blockchain via “mining”. Blockchain “miners” solve a series of
cryptographic equations to add a transaction to the network. As a reward, miners can earn
cryptocurrency. Out of the three types of blockchains, permissionless public blockchain is
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hardest to hack as it is fully decentralized. All participants can keep track of transactions and
look for any mistakes with the ledger.
Permissioned Private blockchains are usually controlled by a single organization. Within
this permissioned blockchain, the central authority can pick who gets to have read/write access.
Therefore, someone who wants to be part of the private blockchain must first get permission to
join. These vetted individuals need to get further access to have read/write access for a certain
blockchain ledger. All other vetted individuals that are not part authorizers for the certain
blockchain ledger do not have read/write access to that certain ledger. However, they will be
authorized individuals for their own blockchain ledger. Trust does not rely on the public keeping
track of all the transactions, instead trust in the private blockchain is given by the central
authority. This key difference makes private blockchain semi-decentralized. A common
consensus algorithm for Permissioned Private Blockchain is Proof-of-Authority. There is no
need for mining, as users are paid (i.e., via salary or business-to-business payment) from the
organization that is in control.
Lastly, Permissioned Public blockchain (or Hybrid blockchains) are similar to private
blockchain. A central authority from an organization vets potential validators. Vetted individuals
may become Authorized Individuals once more screening has been done. Authorized Individuals
will have read/write access while vetted individuals will have read access only. The most
common place for this type of blockchain is in real estate as everyone should be able to read the
price, but only a select few should be changing the price of a home based on economic factors.
Table 1. Difference between the Types of Blockchain
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Permissionless Public

Permissioned Public

Permissioned Private

Who can read/write
transactions?

Everyone has
read/write access

Authorized individuals
have read/write access.
All other vetted
individuals have read
access

Only Authorized
individuals have
read/write access. All
other vetted
individuals have no
access

Level of
Decentralization

Most Decentralized –
Everyone has access
therefore very far from
a central
authority/database

Partially Decentralized
– similar to central
authority as only vetted
individuals have write
access, but not vetted
individuals can catch
mistakes

Least Decentralized –
closest to central
authority as only vetted
individuals have write
access

Level of
Immutability

Most Immutable - as
everyone has access to
read each transaction
made and make sure it
is correct in
accordance with the
consensus algorithm.

Middle Immutable - as
vetted individuals may
possibly be bad actors
but can be kept in
check by the
monitoring of
everyone else who has
read access only.

Least Immutable - only
vetted individuals can
read and write making
it difficult from anyone
on the outside to make
corrections if fault is
found.

After understanding the contrasts that make up different types of blockchain, we must
choose which route to take. Everyone in the public having read and write access to DoD
transactions would be inadvisable. This means even foreign adversaries could have insight to the
records. So, that rules out Permissionless Public blockchain. In the next chapters, we will take a
closer look at Permissioned Public and Permissioned Private Blockchain.
Advanced Blockchain Topics
The next aspect of blockchain technology is smart contracts. A smart contract is a selfexecuting agreement with all participants of the blockchain that is written in programming code.

11
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The smart contract will automatically execute a transaction once the conditions have been met.
This type of contract has benefits over a traditional contract. A traditional contract would use pen
and paper or verbal confirmation to make an agreement between client and vendor. It is difficult
to enforce an agreement without consequences happening to the rule breaker. There are usually
legal systems involved that help maintain the sanctity of the contract between the two parties.
This is time consuming for both parties.

Figure 1. Vending Machine Activity Diagram
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An example that is used to explain smart contracts concisely is the vending machine
metaphor. As seen in Figure 1, the user of the vending machine selects a product. The vending
machine displays the amount the user owes for the product. The user enters the correct amount
displayed. The vending machine checks to make sure that the user has entered greater than or
equal to the right amount. If the user did not meet the conditions of inputting the correct amount
of currency, then the vending machine displays the monetary difference in order for the user to
receive the product. Once the verification has passed, the vending machine dispenses the product
the user chose.
Both parties can see the smart contract and comb it over for any malintent. This is similar
to how people can inspect open-sourced applications. However, in the case of smart contracts, no
one can modify them after they have been deployed. This is to make sure that the transactions are
fair for both parties at all times as they have already been agreed on earlier. With smart contracts
immutable, the problem arises when contracts between parties need further clarification or
modification. Unfortunately, once the smart contract has been deployed (and both parties have
agreed to it) then there is not much else to do with the current contract besides to “self-destruct”
it and start over. “By [upon] calling this self-destruct function, a smart contract can be removed
from the blockchain and all the Ethers on the contract will be transferred to a specified address
[11]”.
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Figure 2. Proxy Contract Diagram
As blockchain knowledge improves, companies such as Open Zeppelin have been able to
work with companies/clients to make a Proxy Contract that holds the state of the blockchain. The
Proxy Contract points to an Implementation Contract which holds the logic for the whole
agreement between company and client. Anytime there needs to be an update made to the logic
of the smart contract, developers can change the Proxy Contract pointer to the new
Implementation Contract. Users will use the same function name in Proxy Contract to call the
function in Implementation Contract. Once a new Implementation Contract is added, the old
Implementation Contract will be disregarded and the new one will take its place [12]. Changing
the terms of the smart contract should only be used rarely as it breaks trust between all the users
of the blockchain if smart contract adjustments are constant. Figure 2 shows the discarding of
Implementation Contracts while Proxy Contract stays the same.
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System Architecture of Permissioned Blockchain
From the “Blockchain Basics” section of the Literature Review, we determined that a
Permissioned Blockchain (either Public or Private) would be ideal for a DoD system by ruling
out Permissionless Public Blockchain. The System Architecture of Permissioned Blockchain
varies slightly between platforms. The most common Permissioned Blockchain platforms
include Ethereum, Quorum, MultiChain, Hyperledger Fabric, and R3 Corda [13]. Since one of
this paper's case studies uses Hyperledger Fabric, we will be discussing Hyperledger Fabric
when it comes to the architecture of Permissioned Blockchains.

Figure 3. High Level View of Hyperledger Architecture [14]
To understand the basics, we need to understand each entity's role in the whole process.
The Membership Service Provider (also known as MSP) “validates, authenticates and allows
access to the network” clients by making use of Certificate Authorities [15]. These Certificate
Authorities, CA, are similar to the ones used by web browsers. The CA also contains what
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privileges a user has with the blockchain, as some users have more responsibilities than others.
Organizations can use any MSP they prefer. There is also no limit to how many can be used for
security purposes. The Client Application interacts with the Hyperledger Fabric client (HFC)
which in turn performs actions on the blockchain.
Everything inside the Hyperledger Fabric Network (Purple Box in Figure 3) is part of the
blockchain. An organization can have many Peers and each Peer may have a different role within
that organization. The Peer can be an Endorser or a Committer. Peers maintain the ledger and
world-state. The world-state is the current “snapshot” of all account balances the Peer node has
access to, while the ledger only contains the sender address, receiver address and transaction
amount data. They commit transactions and may hold smart contracts (in the case of Hyperledger
the smart contract’s name is Chaincode). An Endorsing Peer is a committing peer that also has
the role of sponsoring a transaction proposal and holds a smart contract (in the case of
Hyperledger it is Chaincode) [14]. Since there will be many transaction proposals happening
around the same time, the Ordering Service’s job is to form a coherent order for all the incoming
transactions and transmit all the new orders to all Committing Peers (and Endorsing Peers)
within the blockchain. The Ordering Service contains no smart contract. The Ordering Service is
“plug-and-play” with whatever consensus algorithm that all parties previously agreed on. Solo is
an algorithm where a single node dictates First-In-First-Out order. Another popular algorithm is
the Kafka algorithm, which is known to be crash fault tolerant. Kafka assumes that some of the
nodes in the Ordering Service may fail; however, even in that failure one can achieve consistent
order.
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Figure 4. Step 1 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture (left) [14]
Figure 5. The key that will be used for all the Simple Transactions on Hyperledger
Architecture (right) [14]

The next aspect of understanding the Hyperledger architecture is following the process of
a simple transaction that is seen by everyone in the blockchain. As seen in Figure 4, a client will
propose a transaction by sending a transaction proposal to endorsing peers. The determination of
how many endorsing peers the client sends to is dependent on the endorsement policy. For
instance, an endorsement policy will say that “E0, E1, and E2 must endorse” or “Only two of the
three between E0, E1, or E2 must endorse”
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Figure 6. Step 2 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
The second step is to execute the proposed transaction. If we take the first example as the
endorsement policy, then E0, E1, and E2 all have to execute the transaction. This does not mean
it will update the ledger. As part of the transaction execution each endorsing node captures the
set of Read and Written data, called RW sets” [14]. The execution is signed and encrypted.

Figure 7. Step 3 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
18
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The RW sets are sent back to the HFC application. However, not all sets are returned at
the same time. An RW set contains the signature of the endorsing peer as well as the record
version number.

Figure 8. Step 4 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
Step 4 shows the HFC submitting the responses from the previous step to the Ordering
Service. There may be many submissions from different clients. As mentioned previously, the
Ordering Service’s job is to determine the order of the blockchain using whichever consensus
protocol all parties have agreed on. For testing purposes, many companies use Solo, but the most
common production protocol is Kafka.
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Figure 9. Step 5 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
Step 5 shows the propagation of the block order to all peers (endorsing and committing).
In Figure 9, the diagram displays the Ordering Service sending the block order to P4, which can
then propagate it to other peers that are not directly connected to the Ordering Service. For
instance, P4 can be the one peer that receives the block order from the Ordering Service while
the other peers (that ONLY connect to P4) copies the block order from “P4”.
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Figure 10. Step 6 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
All Committing Peers (in the case of Figure 10: E0, E1, E2, P3, P4) now validate the
newly added block against the endorsement policy. So, if a client wanted to get endorsement
from E0, E1, and E2 but only got endorsed by E0 and E1, then the committing peers reject this
transaction as invalid. Another check is for the RW sets. For example, the verification would
check if two transactions try to update the same data. This can happen if Transaction 1 changes a
variable from 100 to 200 while Transaction 2 (which happens after Transaction 1 in accordance
with Ordering Service’s block order) changes the variable from 100 to 50. Transaction 2 will be
denied as a world state as that variable was not up to date. If it was up to date, then Transaction
2’s variable would start from 200 and decrease accordingly.
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Figure 11. Step 7 for Simple Transaction on Hyperledger Architecture [14]
Finally, all the committing peers will commit the valid transactions by adding the
transaction/block to the blockchain. The client is notified about the success or failure of their
transaction proposal.
From the previous transaction flow, all clients have access to all of the transactions
created up and until that point. This is where the difference between a Permissioned Public and
Permissioned Private is shown. Since all nodes in a Public Permissioned can see every
transaction, there won’t be any need for Channels. With the use of Channels, Hyperledger clients
can have their own mini ledger between smaller groups or two clients. Other clients will not even
know the existence of these channels [16]. So, all the information above is about Permissioned
Public blockchain, while the next part of this section is in reference to Permissioned Private
Blockchain.
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Figure 12. Diagram of Blue and Red Channel within Private Blockchain
In Figure 12, there is a red and blue ledger. E0 and E1 can endorse/commit blocks on the
red ledger. However, E0 is the only Peer that can endorse/commit on the blue ledger as E1 does
not know of the existence of the blue ledger. Since E0 has access to two different ledgers, the
world state (current variables) and Chaincode will be different for each different ledger. Figures
4-10 represent a Single Channel Network.

Figure 13. Multi-Chanel Network [16]
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In the scenario of Figure 13, E0 and E3 endorse/commit to the red channel while E1 and
E2 endorse/commit for the blue channel. The red channel uses the YZ Chaincode and with a Red
Endorsement Policy. The blue channel uses the AB Chaincode with a Blue Endorsement Policy.
The blue/red colorings show all the distinctions between the Channels. The commonality, in this
case, is both Channels use the Ordering Service (also possible to have different Ordering Service
for each Channel).

Figure 14. In-Depth look at a Peer Node [16]
As mentioned before each Peer can connect to any number of Channels (Blue, Red, and
Green) where each Channel maintains a Ledger (labeled Blockchain and World-State in Figure
14). Chaincode A and B are smart contract processes that are instantiated in separate docker
containers, but only one copy of the Chaincode is running at any one point. The Chaincode is
shared across the channels so no state is stored in the Chaincode containers and instead stored
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within the Ledger. There can be further encryption as part of the Local MSP. The emission of
events is sent back to the client showing that they have successfully added a transaction on the
blockchain.
Scalability of the Hyperledger Fabric is not very well documented after 30,000
transactions per second. According to Swati and Venkatesan, “throughput and latency stayed
stable up to 30,000 transactions” [17]. This same paper encourages for future work to improve
scalability from 30,000 transaction per second onwards.
Current DoD System

Figure 15. Block Definition Diagram of GFEBS with other DoD Systems and Vendor
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Figure 16. Internal Block Diagram of GFEBS with other DoD Systems and Vendor
Each branch of the military and agency has their own Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP). The Army uses General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), Logistics
Modernized Program (LMP), and Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). The
Navy uses the Navy ERP while the Air Force is implementing Defense Enterprise Accounting
and Management System (DEAMS). The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) uses the Enterprise
Business System (EBS) and finally the Defense Agency uses the Defense Agency Initiative
(DAI) system [18]. The Standard Financial Information Structure was created such that there is a
standardized financial reporting across DoD. The standardization allows decision makers to
effectively compare programs' efficacy based on revenues and expenses [19]. As seen in Figure
15, there are parts that are not recorded as this is specific to the GFEBS payment interactions
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with vendors. The interactions should be similar between the other ERPs and the federal
agencies that are mentioned in the GFEBS process. This section will go over the GFEBS process
in detail and discuss its connection to United States Standards General Ledger.

Army Financial Process
The Army Financial Process is the most accessible financial process out of all the
military branches. We will be looking at the process where the DoD interacts with a party that is
not part of the government. Vendors are a large part of the DoD budget as “$439 billion were
spent on contracts for products and services” [20]. The payment process towards vendors can be
split into two parts: Pre - Delivery of Goods/Services and Post Delivery of Goods/Services. We
are assuming that the transactions between the Army and vendor are contractual and are to be
paid on time.
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Figure 17. Internal Block Diagram of GFEBS Process [21]
Figure 17 gives a high-level view of the GFEBS process. The part of the figure that this
paper will address is the top half, where financial accounting is done. Once all the information is
processed in the Financial Accounting Box, a proprietary document is sent to the GFEBS
General Ledger. The final step shows the ledger reporting its findings to the USSGL. In the next
section, the USSGL will be discussed thoroughly with examples of Army General transactions
translated over to the USSGL’s Chart of Accounts. Now, in the next few paragraphs, the details
of the GFEBS process shall be explained.
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Figure 18. GFEBS Pre-Delivery Process
Before the goods/services have been delivered, there are several steps to securing funds
and awarding contracts to vendors. Funds that have already been obligated are committed in the
GFEBS [22]. GFEBS is the Systems Applications and Products (SAP) implementation to
account for and manage the Army General Fund [23]. “GFEBS integrates several different
modules to access the same database and use the same master data” [24]. This means that
GFEBS uses a centralized database to read and write data.
Purchase Requisition (PR) Processors initiate the Purchase Requisition (PR) process by
consolidating requirements from Program Managers. “A Purchase Requisition is a document that
records the request for the purchase of goods and/or services that results in a commitment of
funds'' [25]. The PR requirements are reviewed by a Purchase Requisition Approver; however,
the Purchase Requisition Funds Certifier confirms that the right amount of funds exists for the
PR. “After a PR is fund-certified all PRs will require a Purchase Order (PO) to obligate funds''
[25]. A PO is the GFEBS’s way of recording obligations from the pre-commitment records.
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After a contract has been awarded the Purchase Order Processor documents the PO into the
GFEBS database which represents the financial obligation of the contract. A contracting office
must administer the contract to establish an agreement with the awarded vendor. An awarded
contract is a legally-binding agreement between the vendor and the Army for the specific
good/service at the specified price.
The Goods Receipt Processing happens when the goods/services are delivered and
includes the GR and Goods Acceptance (GA) documents. GR are documents of the receiving
goods/services in GFEBS, while GA are documents of the acceptance of goods/service in
GFEBS. Both these records can occur simultaneously or separately. However, if they occur
separately, then there is a time limit for both to be documented. As the person most involved in
coordinating the GR and GA, the Goods Receipt Processor will post both documents onto
GFEBS.
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Figure 19. GFEBS Post-Delivery Process
Now after the goods/services have been delivered in accordance with the awarded
contract, the vendor submits the invoice to the program Invoice, Receipt, Acceptance, Property
Transfer (iRAPT) as goods or services. iRAPT was formerly known as WAWF Business Suite to
consolidate many programs into one. The Invoice Processor receives, verifies, and records
contractual miscellaneous payments in GFEBS at DFAS. If a mistake is found in Invoice, then
the Invoice Processor will try and resolve it. After getting approval from the Invoice Processor,
the Invoice is sent to the matching process. There are two types of matching processes: 3-way
and 4-way. In a 3-way match, The Invoice is compared against PO and GR documents that are
part of the GFEBS. The 4-way matching process is similar except that it also includes GA on top
of the other two GFEBS documents mentioned previously. If the Invoice is ever less than the
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Amount Obligated on the contract or amount on GR, then the process is halted and the Invoice is
sent back to the Invoice Processor for further deducing.
The job of a Payment Processor is to set up parameters and fill in information from the
Invoice into a Proposal File. Since there are multiple types of goods or services, the Payment
Processor establishes different formats based on the Invoice type for each Proposal File. Payment
Proposals display the Invoices that have been correctly matched in either a 3-way or 4-way
Matching. The Payment Proposal File is sent to the Payment Certifier whose job is to verify the
Payment Proposal File. If an error is found, payment is blocked by the Payment Certifier and
sent back to the Invoice Processor to submit. However, if no error is found, then Payment Run is
completed and the Payment Certifier creates Ready-to-Pay Files. These files include a unique
Payment ID and Payment Date. The Payment Run also includes the sending Ready-To-Pay File
to Automated Disbursing System (ADS) or Deployable Disbursing Systems (DDS) for payment
processing. If the vendor is within Continental United States (CONUS), then the files are sent to
ADS. Otherwise, the files are sent to DDS. Post-Pay File, incoming disbursement records from
ADS or DDS, are confirmed with records found in GFEBS using Ready-To-Pay files as
reference. Disbursement information is posted in GFEBS so anyone can view payment history.
Once the Payment Run process is verified, then disbursement files are sent to the US Treasury.
The US Treasury disburses the payment to the vendor's bank of choice. GFEBS general ledger
account postings are processed to be compatible with the United States Standard General Ledger
(USSGL). The next section will discuss the USSGL.
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United States Standard General Ledger (USSGL)
The USSGL is broken up into 7 different parts: Chart of Accounts, Accounts and
Definitions, Account Transactions, Account Attributes for USSGL Proprietary Account and
Budgetary Account Reporting, Crosswalks to Reclassified Statements for FY 20XX (year of
search) Reporting, Governmentwide Treasury Account Symbol Adjusted Trial Balance System
(GTAS) Validations and Edits for FY 20XX (year of search) Reporting, and Crosswalks to
Standard External Reports for FY 20XX (year of search) GTAS Reporting [26]. For brevity, the
paper will only cover Chart of Accounts, Accounts and Definitions, and Account Transactions.
The Chart of Accounts, also known as Standard General Ledger Chart of Accounts, was
established to support the consistent recording of financial events in accordance with the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) and Department of Treasury. The chart contains proprietary
and budgetary accounts that are self-balancing [27]. This means that total debit is the same as
total credits. Budgetary accounts are used to recognize and track budget approvals and execution.
On the other hand, proprietary accounts are in reference to assets, liabilities, revenues, and
expenses [28].
According to the Treasury Financial Manual, the Accounts and Definitions provides basic
information about each USSGL account including: Account Title, Account Number, Balance of
Account (Debit or Credit), and Account Definition” [29]. Also from the Treasury Financial
Manual, Account Transactions displays the proprietary and budgetary entries that are divided in
different organized categories [30].
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Figure 20. Army General Ledgers Transition to USSGL [21]

In the GFEBS, the transactions that were recorded on the Army’s own ledgers will be
formatted so that it can be easily received and recorded in the USSGL. In Figure 20, the
transactions are first recorded in Special Ledger 95 (SL-95) (Operating) as a long specific code.
The next column shows another general ledger that is part of the Army, SL-Z1 (Reporting). The
transactions are grouped to a new simplified code. This can be seen with the codes 6100.11B1,
6100.21T0, and 6100.2533 in the SL-95 that end up as part of group 6100.9000 in SL-Z1. Then
again, the codes are simplified for USSGL purposes that only want to see the basics. This
simplified coding is part of the Chart of Accounts mentioned earlier. In the same example, 6100
in USSGL will be considered an expense in their structured format. Although this is an older
version of the coding, modern Chart of Accounts uses 6-digit codes instead of 4-digits.
Nevertheless, it still demonstrates the transition of financial data from Army General Ledger to
USSGL’s Chart of Accounts.
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Digital Dollar
The United States Federal Reserve is currently discussing the possibility of using a
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). This defined as a digital liability of a central bank that
is widely available to the general public [31]. In another words, it is basically cryptocurrency that
is issued by the United States Government and would equal to exactly to the United States
physical currency. “CBDCs can be based on blockchain, but they do not need to be. The Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston and Michigan Institute of Technology's Digital Currency Initiative
found in their research that distributed ledgers could hinder the efficiency and scalability of a
CBDC” [32]. The Digital Dollar Project is in its very early stages and the Federal Reserve would
need to do more extensive research to see if this project could be feasible and its impact on the
economy.

Real-World Blockchain Implementation
Walmart Canada has pushed blockchain far by launching the “world’s largest full
production blockchain solution for any industrial application” with DLT Labs [33]. Originally,
Walmart was frustrated that a lot of their resources were directed to invoice disputes. It was said
that “70 percent of invoices ended up as disputes and required manual investigations” [5]. This
ended up costing Walmart to overpay for freight deliveries by 38% percent, since it was much
easier to pay what the freight companies wanted instead of disputing [34]. The lengthy process
ended up taking 6-8 weeks to close out the invoices process. The supply chain team at Walmart
Canada decided to ask companies to help with their logistics nightmare. Walmart has already
implemented rudimentary blockchain application where they wanted to trace produce back to the
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farms where they were grown [34]. Since Walmart had experience using blockchain, they were
more comfortable when one of the companies (that was asked to come up with a solution for the
logistical problem) told Walmart they could implement a blockchain system in less time than a
non-blockchain company. Walmart agreed to hire DLT Labs to implement a blockchain system
to help with their freight logistics. Their blockchain system is called DL Freight.

Figure 21. Freight Invoice Process (Pre-DL Freight)
The configuration phase took 8 months, which is faster than normal. This is because
Walmart Canada forewent their proof-of-concept process since DLT Labs were a reliable
business and Walmart had some experience with blockchain already. Their first trial run with
Bison Transport started immediately after with the pilot phase lasting two months. Then 17 more
companies were added to the blockchain system. Within two years, all 70 of Walmart Canada’s
freight vendors had been added to the system. The pre-blockchain invoicing process is similar to
the way DOD’s ERP operates. According to Figure 21, the shipment details are shared between
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Walmart and the freight company. The goods are delivered, where the shipment is either
accepted or denied. If denied, then there needs to be proof as to why the shipment was not
accepted. If accepted, the freight company generates an invoice. This invoice needs to match
with what Walmart expects to pay for the shipment. If there is a difference between Walmart's
expectations and freight company’s expectations, then it gets disputed. These disputes used to
take up to 6-8 weeks to resolve [35]. If the expectations match, then Walmart pays the invoice.

Figure 22. Freight Invoice Process (Post-DL Freight) [36]
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Figure 23. IoT device in conjunction with Blockchain [36]

After the implementation of the DL Freight, the workflow steps were cut in half (as seen
in Figure 22). The first two steps are the same as the previous flowchart (Figure 21). In Figure
23, we see that even before shipping happens, the invoices are populated by two entities: tender
contract and bill of lading. The tender contract is the same as the smart contract where both
parties have already formulated the amount owed based on the variable that will be added to the
invoice. The bill of lading are shipment details that includes date, load, and destination. These
are subject to change for each delivery. While the shipment is being delivered, IOT devices that
are part of the truck adds variable data such as GPS information, temperature checks, and other
real time information to the invoice. “IoT devices are pieces of hardware, such as sensors,
actuators, gadgets, appliances, or machines, that are programmed for certain applications and can
transmit data over the internet or other networks” [37]. This means that there are temperature
sensors, GPS sensors on the truck that relay information back to the blockchain. The blockchain
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will consolidate all the information and add it to the invoice. After the invoice is populated with
the IOT information and last-minute charges from the freight carrier, Walmart immediately pays
the invoice.
This blockchain addition was able to reduce invoice disputes from 70% to 1.5% [5].
However, Shareen Hamilton, VP of Sales and Marketing at DLT Labs, explains that these
“disputes” are more just discrepancies that are actively reconciled [34]. Since there are less
invoice discrepancies, there is not a long list of invoices where a new disputed invoice gets
added to the end. Therefore, all new discrepancies are handled quickly and timely.
DLT Labs considered many blockchain frameworks. First, they decided public
blockchains were too risky for what they had in mind. For private blockchains, they had the
choices of Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, and Quorum. They ended up choosing a Permissioned
Private solution, Hyperledger Fabric [5]. Hyperledger Project is a non-profit organization
launched by the Linux Foundation in 2015 to expand enterprise-grade blockchain across
industries. There are many blockchain frameworks that are part of the Hyperledger Project;
however, Fabric was chosen as it had the most success with other industries such as IBM. Fabric
is an open-sourced platform which has been modified to fit the Walmart system. The Fabric
model is structured as a chain of blocks and has two subsystems: ‘the world state’ and the
‘transaction log’ of all the transactions that led up to the current world state” [5]. Chaincode is
the smart contract feature, employed by Fabric, that bridges the two subsystems by automating
transactions and connecting outside applications to the world state ledger. The smart contract
was designed in a way to be universally accepting of data of any type or any platform. Chaincode
code also contains the rules and calculations that both parties must abide by. The only thing they
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are inputting is the initial variables which both parties already agreed on before the shipment
started. The other variables are from the IOT devices plugged into each freight.

Figure 24. Triple Booking Accounting

Figure 25. Triple Booking Accounting with

(adapted from [5])

multiple Parties (adapted from [5])

Similar to other enterprise-level blockchains, DL Freight uses the triple book accounting
method. In regards to Figure 24, Party A has a credit while Party B has a debit. Party A and Party
B still operate with their own internal systems; they can be synchronized as the shared ledger has
both the credit (In) and debit (Out) values equaling the same amount. Figure 25 shows how
different parties would be inputting their information and adding to the blockchain network.
DL Freight has 17 nodes across the network and is operated by DLT Labs, Walmart
Canada and freight companies. Walmart made the conscious decision to let DLT Labs operate as
a neutral party between Walmart and the freight companies [5]. This is technically not a proper
private blockchain as no third parties (such as DLT Labs) would be involved. These node
operators would upload data from their internal system of records to DL Freights using
application programming interfaces (APIs). APIs are used to link two different applications such
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that the transfer of information is possible. Virtual machines are required by DLT Labs to secure
and protect the data. For another layer of security, the entire network runs without direct access
to the Internet … as users have to go through a series of microservices and firewalls to connect”
[5].

Figure 26. DL Freight’s Information Process [5]

In Figure 26, the DL Freight’s data process is displayed. The first aspect is the shipment
tender from Walmart’s Transportation Management System (TMS) being uploaded to the DL
Freight platform. An acceptance notification is sent back acknowledging the request. Now,
Freight Carriers will accept the shipment tender through the API. Freight Carriers would have
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already connected their IOT devices to their trucks and to the DL Freight system. In this case,
Walmart uses “FourKites, a system that collects and consolidates data from GPS and IoT devices
from their network of [Freight] carriers” [5]. The data from the IoT devices are the variable data
that was mentioned earlier. Walmart’s distribution centers are connected to the DL Freights and
verify the proof of delivery made by the Freight Carriers. Finally, Walmart’s ERP system adds
any accessory charges from the carrier (such as extra wait times or detours) and the invoice is
promptly paid. In the 2021 Walton conference, Sergei Beliaev, DLT Labs EVP and Chief
Strategy Officer, informs that initially the geospatial [and other variable] data was stored onto
the blockchain. However, after careful consideration about the transient nature of this kind of
data, they decided that it makes better sense to have the data off-chain which is directly
connected to the critical information on the chain [36].
Summary
In this Literature Review, we have covered the foundation of blockchain which included
its inheritance traits of immutability and decentralization, as well as different types of
blockchain. In this section we also determined that Permissioned Blockchain would be a more
conducive environment for blockchain than Permissionless Blockchain. The more advanced
topics of blockchain include smart contracts with basic examples of blockchain in action. The
final aspect of the blockchain explanation harkens back to the “Blockchain Basics” portion of the
thesis and breaks down the Permissioned Blockchain using System Architecture. The next part of
the Literature Review is the current process of the DoD using GFEBS as a case study. On the
other hand, the last part of this section covers the real-world blockchain implementation using
Walmart Canada’s DL Freight as an example.

42

AFIT-ENV-MS-22-S-161

III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to lay out and justify the three-point analysis plan. The first
part of the chapter will cover a flowchart used by organizations that are considering blockchain.
The second part of the chapter will consider and convert the established government regulations
and the GAO weakness to requirements that a potential blockchain solution must satisfy. Lastly,
the chapter will end with an explanation of Cost, Time, Throughput, Error Rate, and Latency
Metrics between already existing DoD ERP systems and real-world blockchain implementation.
Ten Step Blockchain Decision Flowchart

Figure 27: Ten Step Decision Path [10]
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The authors of “A Ten-Step Decision Path to Determine When to Use Blockchain
Technologies” [10] compiled a simple outline of whether an organization needs blockchain. If
blockchain is needed, then the authors also supplied reasoning as to which of the blockchain
types (Permissionless Public Blockchain, Permissioned Blockchain, Permissioned Private
Blockchain) would be the best fit for an organization. If an organization answers “Yes” to the
first seven questions then blockchain may be a useful endeavor for the given organization. If no
is answered to any of the first seven questions, then the organization may need to rethink if
blockchain is really necessary. Questions eight through ten determine the type of blockchain that
makes sense for the firm. From Figure 27, we can see that the first aspect to consider is the need
for a shared common database. A shared common database implies that more than one entity
would be able to view or create the data for the database. For small data sets, storing information
onto the blockchain is inconsequential. However, when companies try to scale the database to
larger proportions, “big-database” blockchains they will run into the problem of the blockchain
being slow and expensive due to authentication timings and transaction fees, respectively. The
authors have given a possible solution for the inefficient blockchain by “integrating the
blockchain system with an off-chain database, or simply using a conventional database instead of
a blockchain” [10].
The second question asked by the authors is if multiple parties are involved. The multiple
entities may use different aspects of the database or all of it as needed. The next question refers
to the trust between the parties, or lack thereof. The authors state that “a blockchain is
appropriate if there are trust issues or conflicts of interest between the parties” [10]. If there is
confidence amongst everyone, then a centralized database is ideal as every data entered is trusted
by everyone. In blockchain, trust is determined via smart contracts. Smart Contracts are contracts
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that are embedded into the blockchain via code which multiple parties have agree to ahead of
time. This way all parties know whether to agree to the transparent contract.
The fourth question targets third parties. Usually, third parties are tasked with managing
transactions between two parties. Since smart contracts are deployed, there is no need for a
notary (to confirm a contract) or a bank (money is tied to smart contract). Fees may be incurred
from the third party to the remaining participants. However, a smart contract would bypass the
need for a third party. The fifth question asks if there are different rules that apply to different
members of the blockchain. The author states that “If all participants have the same access rights,
a relational database offers a more feasible solution than a blockchain” [10]. Administrating
which entity has Peer access can play a role in this step as the guideline of the rules for each
member.
The sixth question asks if the rules from the fifth question change. Once a blockchain and
the smart contract have been deployed there isn't a way to change the rules of the smart contract.
Otherwise, parties can modify rules to better fit their needs and it would not be fair for the parties
that have been locked in a contract prior to the change. For example, if a certain threshold is met,
then the smart contract (that all parties have agreed on) will disburse the money according to the
contract. The seventh question takes a look at the necessity for an immutable ledger. As
mentioned in the Literature Review, an immutable ledger means that the log cannot be changed
once a new block (transaction) has been entered. An immutable ledger makes it simple for audits
as there is only one long paper trail to follow to see every transaction made within any given
timeframe. However, if an organization’s ledger experiences many manual inputs, then it may
lead to mistakes caused by human error. In a centralized database, one can edit a transaction,
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albeit with the possibility of getting permission from someone in a higher position or more
knowledgeable about the database. This is not the case on the blockchain. One cannot change the
ledger once the block (transaction) is on the blockchain due to its immutability. If “Yes” is
answered to any of the first seven questions, then typically blockchain is not required according
to the authors of Figure 27.
The eighth question is the first part of finding out if Permissionless Public Blockchain is
right for an organization. Public access means that anyone can join and no vetting process is
administered. Writing and Validating blocks (transactions) to the blockchain is given to anyone
that joins the open blockchain. Determining who has writing and validating access is one of the
biggest demarcations between 3 major types of blockchain. If “No” is answered for the eighth
question, then it automatically goes to the 10th question according to Figure 27. The ninth
question is the second part if Permissionless Public is the choice for a firm. Transaction going
public implies that anyone in the public blockchain can view the data. This choice determines if
the organization would make sense with either a public or private blockchain. Examples of
Permissionless Public Blockchain include Ethereum and Bitcoin, therefore there would need to
be cryptocurrency involved with the public blockchain choice.
If the eighth or ninth question ended up being “No”, then the final question asks where
consensus is determined between the two permissioned blockchain. Permissioned blockchains
only allow vetted individuals to the blockchain network. The two types of permissioned
blockchains are decided based on how everyone on the blockchain can agree upon the validity of
the block added to the blockchain. For a Permissioned Public blockchain, all vetted personnel
can read the data and submit transactions; however, only authorized personnel validate those
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transactions. According to the authors, incorporating this strategy encourages interorganizational consensus [10]. On the other hand, for Permissioned Private blockchain, only
authorized personnel can read, write, and validate transactions. In other words, an ideal situation
to use Permissioned Private blockchain would be with only people within the organization who
determine the consensus. Hyperledger is versatile such that it can be used for Permissioned
Public or Permissioned Private blockchain.
Regulations and Weaknesses Requirements
The potential blockchain financial system must follow the regulations of the current
financial system. According to GAO, “For federal financial management systems, a migration
plan should also address Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA)
requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the USSGL at the transaction level”
[7]. The second section covers the GAO Weaknesses that was mentioned in the Problem
Statement. The four weaknesses are translated to their requirements. A Requirement Matrix for
all the requirements mentioned above will be connected to the blockchain components that
satisfy them.
Regulations Requirements

Figure 28. Definitions for FFMIA Requirements
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Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) goals are to provide
dependable and unvarying financial data while applying the highest accounting standards. The
Federal Financial Management System (FFMS) supports the goals of the FFMIA in three
different aspects: “reliable financial reporting, effective and efficient operations, and compliance
with applicable laws and regulations” [38]. The first aspect is covered by “Capture Recipients
Information,” “Determine Disbursements terms and amounts,” “Provide Payment data required
to post GL transactions consistent with USSGL,” “Capture GL account transactions with
UGGL,” “Post GL transactions consistent with attributes codes and categories,” “Provide GL
information for consolidated government wide reporting,” and “Provide GL information for
agency-specific financial statement reporting.” [39]. The “effective and efficient operations”
requires actions that cut waste, loss and misuse of financial information. The last part of the
OMB statement is self-explanatory. Figure 28 summarizes all the requirements and definitions
for the FFMIA portion.

Figure 29. Definitions for Federal Accounting Standards and USSGL Requirements
For the Applicable Federal Accounting Standards, the “system shall maintain accounting
data to permit reporting in accordance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP)” [38]. 10 Principles of GAAP include Principle of Regularity, Consistency, Sincerity,
Permanence of Methods, Non-Compensation, Prudence, Continuity, Periodicity, Materiality,

48

AFIT-ENV-MS-22-S-161
Utmost Good Faith [40]. Figure 29 contains all the definitions for the accounting standards’
requirements.
As part of the USSGL at transaction level aspect, “each time an approved transaction is
recorded in the financial management system, it will generate appropriate general ledger
accounts for posting the transaction according to the rules” [38]. This requirement is the same as
“Capture GL Accounts” from the FFMIA requirements.

Four Weaknesses in Information Technology

Figure 30. Definitions for GAO Weaknesses Requirements
The GAO has recommended that the DoD should remediate four weaknesses in the
Information Technology sector. These weaknesses have been identified in the FY2020 report,
but have persisted in the FY2021 report as well. There are attempts at this endeavor, but
according to the Pentagon’s Comptroller and GAO some of them will not be fully solved until
2027 or 2036 [2], [4]. Figure 30 breaks down each of the weaknesses to the requirement
definitions. The GAO defines Configuration and Security Management as the “control that
prevent unauthorized changes to systems and aid in assessing risk, developing, and implementing
security procedures, and monitoring effectiveness” [4]. This asks the question: Can a feature of
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blockchain stop data change that hinders normal processes or triggers security measures? The
two aspects of Access Control that GAO wants to tackle is to ensure that authorized roles are
reasonable and prevent personnel from accessing information they are not supposed to have [4].
The Segregation of Duties weakness is defined as users having conflicting key roles and
functions [4]. It is expected that this will also be tackled at the same time when Access Control
will be remediated. Legacy System’s weakness states that there are many internal flaws which
include not being able to capture transaction-level details that satisfy accounting needs. This
leads to manual reports which are hard to track down for audits. There are 140 systems that do
not meet Federal requirements that have not been retired and will not be until 2036 [4]. Nine
legacy systems were scheduled to retire within FY2020, but extended that deadline to 2021.
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Requirements Matrix

Figure 31. Requirements Satisfaction Matrix
With Figure 31 as a reference, all the requirements are listed in hierarchy order in the yaxis. Along the x -axis, the components of blockchain are also listed in hierarchy form. Some of
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the GAO requirements may be administrative issues and not really an aspect of the current
system’s ERP. These requirements will be discussed further in the analysis portion of the thesis.

Performance Metrics
Ideally, the best way to compare two uneven systems would be to find see how one
system’s metrics would change based on the environment that the other system is in. This is not
yet possible because the DoD has not implemented a blockchain ERP solution. Therefore, we
will only be looking at the metrics of the three systems and urge for comparison research for the
future.
For this paper, we will be looking at three different current systems. One current system
is DEAMS. The Air Force is in the process of switching from a legacy system to a modern
system. DEAMS still uses the traditional ledger system, but has been updated to keep up with
current transaction infrastructure. The modernization means that there will be up-to-date data
surrounding it. Many other ERP systems the military branches use have been established a long
time ago and there are not many accessible sources. The other system for comparison is GFEBS.
Just like DEAMS it employs a traditional ledger system. GFEBS is used because it has the most
public information available. In future studies, other ERPs should be used for comparison. The
analysis will include the world's largest industrial development of blockchain, Walmart Canada’s
DL Freight [33] as the placeholder for the potentially new blockchain. The use of Walmart DL
Freight is important because it is already implemented large-scale, was established recently (in
2020), and shared a similar invoicing process to DEAMS and GFEBS.
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The metrics this paper will use Cost, Time, Throughput, Latency and Error Rate. Cost
will be the Life Cycle Cost for the system. In the case of DEAMS, it has not yet been fully
deployed, so the most recent estimate will suffice. The Time metric is how long the system took
to reach full deployment. Just like the Cost metrics, only estimates for how long DEAMS will
take are available since DEAMS has not been fully deployed. Throughput, in this paper, will
refer to how many invoices are processed in a year. Latency is determined on the average time of
each invoice processed and the percentage of vendors who are paid on time. Being “paid on
time” as a DOD vendor is under 30 days. Congress passed the Prompt Pay Act where agencies
have an obligation to pay every proper invoice within 30 days after the first invoice day or else
pay interest on the late payment [41]. Finally, the Error Rate is the percentage of mistakes found
in the invoicing process.
Summary
The three-point plan was explained thoroughly in the methodology section. The first part
explained each decision point in the flowchart to determine if blockchain is really necessary to
begin with. The second portion discussed all the requirements, based on government regulations
and problem areas, that a potential blockchain system should fulfill. Finally, the methodology
clarified why DEAMS and GFEBS are good points of comparison for Walmart’s DL Freight. It
also showed how Cost, Time, Throughput, Latency, and Error Rate will be displayed for the
three systems mentioned previously. The next chapter will analyze the three-point plan
mentioned above.
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IV. Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview
In this chapter, there will be three different analyses done to answer the investigative
questions. The first analysis will be on the 10-Step Blockchain Flowchart, where each decision is
carefully considered before ultimately choosing whether blockchain is right for the DoD and if
so, which one. The second analysis will cover the rules, regulations, and weaknesses of the DoD
using Requirements Matrices as evidence. Finally, the third analysis will cover cost, time and
benchmark metrics for each of the current DoD systems and real-world implementation of
blockchain.
10-Step Blockchain Decision Analysis

First Decision
The first decision in the flowchart is if there is a need for a shared common database. A
shared database allows for all viewers on a team to read and write data on to it. Just within
GFEBS of the Army Financial System, the Purchase Requisition (PR) Processor, PR Approver,
PR Funds Certifier, Purchase Order Processor, Goods Receipt Processor, and Invoice Processor
all order and vendor information so that everyone down the line of the process can use the data.
Each GFEBS worker has an interfacing application that already communicates to the centralized
shared database. Vendors can also see the timeline of their invoice becoming a check in their
bank account. There is also a need for a shared common database as many users are reliant on it.
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Second Decision
The second-choice questions if multiple parties are involved. For example, there are
vendors (who are not part of any government agency) and a government agency. Another party
that is involved are auditors that meticulously comb through transactions to ensure legitimacy for
the transactions. In Figure 27, we can see the interactions of the parties mentioned above. The
reason this question is asked is to understand that the data is not part of an internal organization.
Otherwise, the database would make the most sense. However, since there are multiple parties
involved, the answer is yes for this question.
Third Decision
This section will discuss the competing interests between vendors and government
agencies. Since vendors are private companies, they are motivated by maximizing corporate
profits and shareholder values by selling their goods/service. However, the corporation’s strategy
to make profits may not clearly align with United States military strategies. For example, there
was a contract dispute between the DOD and Lockheed Martin about the Primer situation for the
F-35’s. “At the time, corrosion was found in fastener holes of F-35’s being repaired at Hill Air
Force Base in Utah. Lockheed and the JPO [F-35 Joint Program Office] were able to agree on a
corrective action plan, one source said, and Lockheed was able to complete planned deliveries of
the F-35 for 2017” [42]. Although a plan was put in place, the dispute occurred when the
question of who was going to foot the bill for all the corrections. The DOD’s argument was that
the F-35 did not pass Lockheed Martin’s Quality Assurance testing and delivered an incomplete
product. Therefore, Lockheed Martin had to fix and not charge any amount to the DOD. On the
flip side, Lockheed Martin's argument was that since they were correcting every fastener hole in
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every F-35, they needed a lot of manhours to fix the issue. So, Lockheed Martin wanted to be
paid for the labor costs. The frequency of new disputes has decreased from 2007 to 2014. In the
FY 2021 annual report, “contractors docketed only 400 new appeals… for comparison, the
Board docketed 497 appeals last year [2020]; 708 in FY 2014 and 624 during FY 2007… At the
end of conclusion of FY 2021, the Board’s total docket included 954 cases, a number which has
increased slightly (up from 947) since the beginning of FY 2021” [43]. With the ever-growing
list of contract disputes, we can see that there are parties with competing interests.
Fourth Decision

Figure 32. Credit Card Authorization Process
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Figure 33. Credit Card Settlement Process
For the question of whether there are parties that want to avoid a trusted third party, we
need to first ask if there are third parties involved at any given time. In a normal interaction for
non-cryptocurrency users, the bank and credit card companies play the role of the third party. As
seen in Figure 32 and Figure 33, there are two parts of the credit card process. The authorization
part has 3 entities besides the user and vendor involved in the process. If we follow the
flowchart, we can see that the transaction data is sent from the vendor to the payment processor.
The payment processors are businesses used by vendors to process the credit card information.
Common examples include Paypal and Square. The information is then sent to the User’s credit
card company. These would include Visa, MasterCard, or American Express. The information is
then passed down to the user’s bank or whomever the user holds their credit card with.
Companies may include Bank of America, Chase, etc. The bank will verify if the user has
enough funds on their credit line (credit card) or in their bank account (debit card). If approved,
the bank will put a hold on the account for the money owed and send the approval response
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through the credit card company and payment process to the vendor. However, if the bank denies
the transaction, then the declined message travels the same way as the approval message to the
vendor. The vendor will complete the transaction if the approval message came through or will
not provide goods/service if denied messages come through the pipeline [44].

Figure 34. Simple Blockchain Transaction Process
However, the process is not fully complete. Now it is time for the Vendor to be paid out.
Vendors will send the compilation of the approved payments to their payment processor
(whomever they pay to use). The Payment Processor will send the appropriate transaction to the
user’s credit card company. The Credit card company will send that data to the user’s bank. The
user’s bank then charges the user for the hold that they had for the transaction mentioned above.
They also keep a small credit card fee. If the good/service was paid for with debit then no fee is
taken. The bank then routes the funds to the vendor’s bank minus more transaction fees from the
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payment processor [44]. Every step of the way the vendor is not getting a full amount of money.
Blockchain is planning to change this by having direct interactions between the user and the
vendor. In Figure 34, the process is condensed to the user and vendor, with the distributed
database holding the publicly available transaction. The user makes a purchase, then the
distributed database holds the transaction. The miners are rewarded for committing the
transaction and then the vendor receives the funds. The vendor just needs to provide the
goods/service to finish the whole process [45].
We see how a simple blockchain was able to remove the third party from the transaction
process. Is it possible to replicate blockchain for a private company and a vendor when there is
no third party? Walmart and Coca Cola are private companies that have successfully
implemented blockchain without having third parties in the first place [46]. So, it is feasible for
DoD to implement blockchain despite not having a third party.
Fifth Decision
The next question pertains to the different rules between each participant within a system.
Currently, the GFEBS process only allows one of the vendors to see their own invoice being
processed. Allowing vendors to see other vendors can cause a security risk, since vendors see
other transactions that the DoD has made. These transactions could be leaked to foreign
adversaries. This rule would still need to be in place for the potential blockchain system which
pushes us to the next question.
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Sixth Decision
Will the rules be constant once they are first enacted? Since the blockchain is difficult to
change once it has been deployed, all parties must agree to all the rules beforehand. This goes
hand in hand with the explanation of immutable capability that blockchains possesses. The rules
that everyone agrees on is part of the smart contract. So just like any other contract, it is also
good business etiquette to not continuously change the contract rules.
Seventh Decision
The seventh question asks if there is a need for an objective immutable log. An
immutable log will be easy to track transactions down via an audit trail as nothing can be
changed once a transaction/block is added to the chain. What if there was a human error in the
invoice while submitting? The GFEBS have tools to quickly correct any mistakes that happen.
However, once a transaction has been entered into the blockchain, it cannot be edited or changed
in any manner. “Departments and agencies having the ability to integrate transactional level
control over data and write that to a blockchain make it harder to alter and easier to share. Data
can be stored off chain and a hash or pointer to the data can be saved on chain, making any
alteration or access apparent and traceable” [47]. Storing the “non-transactional” data off-chain
creates efficient storage possibilities as the “non-transactional” data will only be hashed pointer
and not the entirety of the “non-transactional” data. As mentioned before, smart contracts deploy
transactions once a certain threshold is met. In the case of Walmart, the smart contract
“automates all transactions and data points using GPS and IoT to track everything, including
checking truck refrigeration temperatures for food shipments, said Walmart Canada, one of the
country’s largest employers [48]. GPS is attached to all vehicles which constantly updates the
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smart contract of what is owed between Walmart and the vendor. If there is a dispute, Walmart
can rely on the multiple routes taken from the trucking company as a baseline to express the
price seen in the blockchain transaction. Walmart was able to reduce over 70% of invoices
disputed to just 1.5% of invoices disputed after introduction to the private blockchain [35]. Since
there are no humans to make human errors, blockchains are able to avoid editing with the use of
smart contracts.
Eighth Decision
In the Literature Review portion of this thesis, it was determined that giving public access
to potentially DOD blockchain would be unwise. Anyone, including the United States’ foreign
adversaries, could join the blockchain. Obviously not giving access to adversaries is highly
advisable and therefore there is no need for public access.

Ninth Decision
The ninth decision would not be asked since the answer to the eight decision goes straight
to the tenth decision. For sake of being thorough, let us consider if there is a need for public
transactions. This would entail anyone, including foreign adversaries to read/write data onto the
blockchain. For the same reasons given in the eighth decision, we see that the answer would also
be “NO” to the question of “are transactions public”. This solidifies that Permissionless Public
Blockchain is not the right decision when it comes to a potentially DOD Blockchain. Either way,
the tenth decision is the next aspect of the flowchart.
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Tenth Decision
Finally, the last decision asks where the consensus is determined. The current DOD
contracting system does not openly show contracting details for all vendors to see. For example,
Contractor X does not see the contract information between the DOD and Contractor Y (and vice
versa). Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4 and Trade Secrets Act prevents the
disclosure of “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
which is privileged or confidential” [49]. So, whenever a contractor learns that someone
submitted a FOIA request, the contractor will use “Exemption 4 to prevent the Government from
disclosing bid and proposal information, as well as other information submitted pursuant to a
government contract” [50].
With a Permissioned Public Blockchain, all vendors would be able to see the transaction
between other vendors and the DOD. No vendor would join this type of blockchain because
contractors would use the FOIA Exemption 4 as a reason not to join. However, with a
Permissioned Private Blockchain, vendors would not even know of the existence of transactions
they are not privy to. As explained in the Hyperledger diagrams in the Literature Review, the
Peers can be part of different blockchains and only are knowledgeable to the ones they are part
of. Permissioned Private Blockchain checks all the boxes a potential DOD blockchain could be.

10-Step Blockchain Flowchart Summary
In the fifth decision, there were no third parties to remove to make Blockchain applicable.
However, real-world implementation, such as Walmart’s DL Freight, also did not use third
parties. Although this flowchart would have ended at the fifth decision, the real-world
deployment of blockchain was practical enough to continue through the flowchart. The next big
62

AFIT-ENV-MS-22-S-161
decision was determining that Permissionless Public Blockchain would not make sense for the
DOD. Finally, the last decision was finding if Permissioned Public or Permissioned Private
Blockchain would be ideal for DOD. With the consideration of contracts opting out of sharing
private financial transactions with one another, it made the most sense for the DOD to implement
a Permissioned Private Blockchain.
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Regulations and Weaknesses Requirements Analysis

Figure 35. Regulations and Weakness Requirements Matrix (Completed)
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From Figure 35, we see the Requirements Matrix filled out for the FFMIA, GAAP
Principles, and GAO Weaknesses. The next few tables will give an explanation as to why a
certain aspect of the private blockchain satisfies the requirements in order.
Addressing Each Requirement
Table 2. FFMIA Regulations Requirements Matrix Direct Satisfaction Explanation
FFMIA Requirements

Explanation

1.1:
Recipient’s information

● World State: captures the current state of the financial
data for the parties involved (including recipient and
donor)
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties (recipients and donor)
● Client-Side Application: displays recipient information for
users

1.2
Determine Disbursements
Terms and Amounts

● World State: captures the current state of the financial
data for the parties involved
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties including the disbursement amounts
● Smart Contracts: captures the terms of the disbursement at
all times (which has been determined by all parties prior
to blockchain deployment)
● Client-Side Application: displays disbursement terms and
amounts for users

1.3
Provide Payment Data

● World State: captures the current state of the payment data
for the parties involved
● Blockchain: captures transfer of payment between two
parties
● Smart Contracts: automatically calculates the payment
owed from one party to another based on variables for the
smart contract equation
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● Client-Side Application: displays payment data and
format it to align with USSGL codes
1.4
Capture GL Account

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s
payment account (all accounts part of GL)
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties
● Client-Side Application: displays GL account transactions
and submits it to the USSGL (in correct format)

1.5
GL Matching Codes

● Smart Contracts: contains the necessary variables such
that the transaction information can consistently be
modified later to match USSGL codes
● Client-Side Application: once the transaction information
has been received from the private blockchain, it can be
modified to fit USSGL code format at this stage

1.6
Government Wide
Reporting

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s
payment account (all accounts part of GL)
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties
● Client-Side Application: once the transaction information
has been received from the private blockchain, it can be
modified to fit government wide reporting format at this
stage

1.7
GL Agency Specific
Reporting

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s
payment account (all accounts part of GL)
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties
● Client-Side Application: once the transaction information
has been received from the private blockchain, it can be
modified to any fit agency specific reporting format at this
stage
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1.8
Cut Misuse

● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties, in order, so no loss of financial
information
● Smart Contracts: captures only the necessary variables to
formulate the transaction payment
● Client-Side Application: displays most up-to-date & noloss financial information for users

Table 3. GAAP Principles Requirements (Direct Satisfaction) Matrix Explanation
GAAP Principle
Requirements

Explanation

2.1
Regularity

● Permissioned Private Blockchain: all other GAAP Principle
Requirements have been satisfied by some part of the
Permissioned Private Blockchain

2.2
Consistency

● Smart Contracts: once the blockchain has been deployed the
smart contract does not change, therefore users can rely on the
contract being consistent
● Endorsing Policy: This policy also is determined when the
blockchain is deployed where the number and type of peers are
constant

2.3
Sincerity

● World State: captures the most up-to-date account information,
so it will be impartial
● Blockchain: captures all transactions, so it provides impartial
transaction information between all parties
● Client-Side Application: displays all transaction information,
therefore all the data is impartial

2.4
Permanence of
Methods

● Smart Contract: When the blockchain is deployed the smart
contract is set in stone and cannot be changed. This leads to fair
comparison of financial data
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● Client-Side Application: displays fair comparison of financial
data for users
2.5
Non-Compensation

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s payment
accounts which does not show bias
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties. If all the information is shown then no
bias can occur.
● Client-Side Application: displays the raw financial data for
users

2.6
Prudence

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s payment
accounts so no speculation is needed
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties. If all the information is shown then no
speculation occurs
● Client-Side Application: displays non-speculated financial
information for users

2.7
Continuity

● Permissioned Private Blockchain: users can read assets while
others can write to assets as long as the blockchain is still
deployed
● Client-Side Application: front facing application continues to
operate while assets are evaluated

2.8
Periodicity

● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties in order. This means that authorized users
can read the recorded times when transactions occurred
● Ordering Service: This service distributes all the transactions in
order to all the Peer Nodes, therefore showing every authorized
user the recorded times when the transactions occurred
● Client-Side Application: displays the recorded times when
transactions occurred for users

2.9
Materiality

● Client-Side Application: disclose/displays all financial and
accounting data for users
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2.10
Utmost Good Faith

● Consensus Algorithm: This unchanging algorithm, that all
parties have agreed on, orders data values and achieves an
agreement between all the nodes. Since it is unchanging and
code, it cannot be display malintent
● Smart Contract: The unchanging contract has had all parties
have agreed on prior to deployment of private blockchain, so
no malice can occur after
● Client-Side Application: displays honest transactions for users

Table 4. USSGL at Transaction Level Requirements Matrix Explanations
USSGL at
Transaction Level
Requirements
3
USSGL at
Transaction Level

Explanation

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s payment
accounts when a transaction provided by supporting financial
sources occurs
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties
● Client-Side Application: displays GL account transactions
provided by supporting financial sources for users

Table 5. Four Weaknesses Requirements Matrix Explanations
Requirements
4.1.1
Unauthorized
Changes

Explanation
● Consensus Algorithm: If there is typo or malintent behind a
transaction then it won't get added as the consensus algorithm
will read the other nodes blockchain and realize the one added
does not match up with everyone else's ledger.
● Smart Contract: All parties have agreed on the unchanging
contract prior to deployment of private blockchain, so no malice
can occur after.
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● Client-Side Application: displays authorized changes for users

4.2.1

No, this is an administrative requirement where people may have needed

Reasonable

access to confidential material at a certain point, but their privileges have

Authorization

not been revoked yet. Another reason could be they were mistakenly
given access to this sensitive information.

4.2.2
Sensitive
Information

4.3.1
Deconflict users
from key roles and
function

● Channels: only Peer Nodes within a Channel have access to the
financial transaction. All other Peer Nodes do not know the
existence of the Channel
● Smart Contract
● Peer Node: part of multiple channels. If a Peer Node is not part of
Channel, then it will not even know it’s existence. Therefore,
only need-to-know financial data can be seen/written to.
● Client-Side Application: displays GL account transactions for
authorized users only
No, this requirement requires the administration to satisfy. It is the
administration’s job to not put users in a position where a conflict of
interest may arise. The administration would need to know the
background of its users and then assign key roles. Once the key roles
have been assigned then a private permissioned blockchain separate
people based on authorization level

4.4.1
Capture Transaction
Level Details

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s payment
accounts when a transaction provided by supporting financial
sources occurs
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties
● Smart Contract: can be programmed to capture whatever details
are necessary for the transaction
● Client-Side Application: displays transaction level details for
users
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4.4.2
Contain
documentation for
auditors

● World State: captures the current state of the party’s payment
account (all accounts part of GL)
● Blockchain: captures all past and current GL transactions
between two parties in order such that auditors can see the
transaction flow
● Client-Side Application: displays/formats the Ledger of each
Peer Node for auditors

Requirements Matrix Summary
A Permissioned Private Blockchain contains components to successfully tackle FFMIA
Regulations and GAAP Principles. This is shown via Tables 2-4, as private blockchain satisfying
all regulation between FFMIA and GAAP. Table 5 shows that there are parts of the GAO
Weakness that cannot be satisfied by private permissioned blockchain alone. These include
Requirements 4.2.1 and 4.3.1, where it was determined that the administration of the agency
would be ones to satisfy these weaknesses' requirements. It is safe to conclude that inclusion of
Permissioned Private Blockchain will not break any rules or regulations that currently stand.
Performance Metrics Analysis
Cost Analysis
The DEAMS system is divided into two stages, Increment 1 and Increment 2. DEAMS
Increment 1 “uses commercial off the shelf enterprise resource planning software to provide
accounting and management services'' [53]. Ideally it should be able to “provide financial data to
decision makers'', “provide budget formulation, funds, distributions and cost modeling”,
“manage DOD appropriated working capital funds, and process budgetary, accounting and
vendor pay transactions'' [53]. Increment 1 was completed in 2020 and has added 17,000 users
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across 170 different locations [7]. Increment 2, now known as DEAMS Continuous Capability
Development, is on the way and is scheduled to add another 4,500 new users. Eventually the
goal is to fully migrate and replace the legacy platform, GAFS-R, to DEAMS. The system has
had major delays in its way of deployment which also cost more than what the original budget
was set for. The GAO explains in their estimates that “in October 2010, [GAO] reported that the
life cycle cost increased to about $2 billion through fiscal year 2027 with an expected full Prior
Reports on DOD Financial Management deployment in fiscal year 2017—a 3-year slippage from
the full deployment date reported at program initiation” [7]. As of the latest GAO reports in
2021, the cost has increased to a total life cycle cost of $3.4 billion [7].
In GAO GFEBS 2012 report, the Army estimates the life cycle cost estimate for GFEBS
to be approximately $1.3 billion in 2012 money [54]. When adjusted to inflation, the amount is
near $1.68 billion for the estimated total life cycle cost of GFEBS.
For the DL Freight Blockchain, there is not a comprehensive document with the cost
breakdown. However, with Walmart Canada’s public statements, we can get a max price of the
process. Walmart announced that there would be a “$3.5 billion [Canadian dollars CAD]
investment over the next five years aimed to generate significant growth and to make the online
and in-store shopping experience simpler, faster and more convenient for Walmart’s customers”
in 2020 [55]. In the same article, Walmart mentions that $1 billion CAD will go towards
remodeling and opening new stores while another $1.1 billion CAD would be spent on two new
distribution centers [55]. Finally, the article mentions that DL Freight expansion will be part of
the $3.5 billion, although it does not refer to how much will be spent. Since DL Freight is neither
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part of remodeling or the creation of new distribution centers, we are going to assume the
maximum expense of the DL Freight would be:
$3.5 billion - $1 billion - $1.1 billion = $1.4 billion
The 1.4 billion price tag may include other non-blockchain expenses. However, with little
information on the breakdown of Walmart’s investments, we will assume the worst-case scenario
as all 1.4 billion dollars towards the blockchain effort. At the time of announcement in July of
2020, the conversion rate would change from $1.4 billion CAD to $1.03 billion USD.

Figure 36. Life Cycle Cost of each System
Figure 36, we see the Lifecyle Cost for each system where the y-axis is the $USD billions
in 2020. DL Freight cost less than both DEAMS and GFEBS. However, we do not know how
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DL Freight Lifecyle Cost could change if it was put in the same DoD environment as DEAMS
and GFEBS.
Time Analysis

Figure 37. DEAMS’s Increment 1 and Increment 2 Projected Timeline
As mentioned previously, the DEAMS system has been setback many times. In 2010, it
was determined that the full deployment of Increment 1 would be in 2017. However, during
2014, it was decided that Increment 1 would not be able to finish by the 2017 deadline, and
would be pushed back to 2020. Increment 2, now known as DEAMS Continuous Capability
Development, is scheduled to compete by 2031. The GAO reports, “The Air Force has recently
identified estimates of cost, capabilities, and schedule for the DEAMS Continuous Capability
Development from fiscal years 2022 to 2031” [7]. Looking at the previous statement and Figure
37, the partial timeline completed by GAO, we can see that the whole DEAMS process,
including Increment 1 and 2, is estimated to take a total of 28 years from initiation to completion.
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Figure 38. GFEBS Timeline
According to the GAO GFEBS 2012 report, Army started the GFEBS process in October
2004 and was “fully deployed to all intended users by July 2012” [54]. So, it took close to 8
years for GFEBS to be fully implemented. In the 2007 GFEBS Schedule PowerPoint, John
Miller breaks down the first years of GFEBS timeline into Technology Demonstration from the
beginning to Q4 2006, Garrison Requirements from Q4 2006 to Q3 2008, and first deployment
from Q3 2008 to Q2 2009 [56]. However, the GFEBS Deployment Schedule was created in 2009
and gives a better look at the process from that point onwards. This PowerPoint dissects the
timeline again by displaying Replaying Legacy Systems pt. 1 from Q2 2009 to Q1 2010 and
Replaying Legacy Systems pt. 2 from Q1 2010 to Q2 2012 [57]. Finally, in Q2 2010, GFEBS
would be fully implemented (seen in Figure 38).
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Figure 39. Walmart’s DL Freight Implementation Timeline
The private blockchain system that we will be comparing the existing financial system to
is Walmart’s DL Freight blockchain. In 2018, their supply chain and logistics team wanted to
know if there was any existing technology to help improve the invoicing problems they were
dealing with. Many solutions were given; however, Walmart Canada went with DLT Labs as
their provider of a blockchain platform. “The development cycle took only eight months from
conception to live deployment. The first two months were spent specifying the requirements for
the engagement. The next two months were spent configuring and testing DL Freight to meet
specifications. The pilot phase, which included Bison Transport, one of Walmart Canada’s
largest freight carriers, took four months” [5]. The configuration process then only took two
months which passed audits from Walmart Canada. The proof-of-concept phase was skipped as
DLT Labs had proven their platform was satisfactory. In January 2019, DLT Labs went straight
to the production pilot phase with Bison Transport being one of the first companies to attempt
the new system. According to a Technical Communicator at DLT Labs, Abhisek Mohanty,
Walmart was able to onboard the rest of the carriers (70 total) by February 2020 [58]. This
means that the Known Time is 17 months. Figure 39 encapsulates all the information above in an
easy-to-read timeline.
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Figure 40. Full Deployment Timeline of Each System
For Figure 40, we can condense the timelines for each system and we see that DEAMS,
GFEBS and DL Freight will be implemented in 336 months, 93 months, and 17 months,
respectively. Once again, we are not sure how DL Freight Deployment will change based on
many different DoD circumstances.
Throughput Analysis
As mentioned previously, Throughput is the number of invoices processed annually by
each system. The total number of DEAMS invoices in Q1 2022 was around 70,000 [51]. If we
scale the number of invoices to one year, then we get 280,000 invoices annually. It was
previously mentioned that GFEBS processed $140 billion annually in 2012. At the same time, it
also processed approximately 1 million transactions a day [52]. If we scale the $140 billion to
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$180.7 billion dollars, then the same scaling factor means that the 1 million transactions per day
would be 1.3 million transactions per day. For the DL Freight, the Hyperledger foundation case
study mentions that a total of 200,000 invoices get processed over the course of 6 months [35].
Scaling it up to a year, this amounts to 400,000 invoices over 1 year.

Figure 41. Throughput (Invoices) for each System
In Figure 41, GFEBS processes the greatest number of invoices which makes sense as
this system has the most amount of money processed. This table does not represent the max
throughput for each system, just the average throughput annually. There is not sufficient data
determining the absolute limits for each system.
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Benchmark Analysis
DEAMS Increment 1 improved drastically from a 2015 report. The DEAMS 2015 report
talks about the 2014 Fiscal Year. In the 2014 fiscal year, DEAMS “did not meet the 95 percent
threshold of balancing of timely accounts (i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually)” [59]. In the 2022
Procure-2-Pay Presentation, we see the percentage of invoices that are paid within 30 days of
invoice submission date is 81% [51]. During FY2014, DEAMS was only able to balance 97.5%
of Treasury funds [59]. During the FY2018, it was determined that DEAMS was now able to
balance 98.8 percent of US Treasury funds [53]. This shows that DEAMS has an error rate of
1.2%. From the 2022 Procure-2-Pay Presentation, we see that the average number of days from
invoice submission date to approval date is about 5 days from FY22 [51].
In accordance to a 2013 OMB report, “GFEBS consistently experiences approximately a
40% failure rate requiring invoices to be manually posted in GFEBS to correct errors” [101].
Concurrently, a pilot program called Supplier Self Services (SUS) shows the failure rate going
from 40% to 7%. After that 2013 OMB report, SUS has been implemented since and no more
error rate detail has been publicly available. We are going to assume that GFEBS’s (with SUS
implemented) error rate is at 7%. In the same Procure to Pay presentation mentioned recently,
GFEBS has an average of 5 days from invoice submission to approval date. Additionally, the
percentage of invoices paid within 30 days is around 79%.
Shannon Hamilton, marketing lead at DLT Labs, comments that all the invoice disputes
are just easily resolved discrepancies [34]. Both parties involved wanted the manual reviews to
be fresh in their minds, so investigating discrepancies immediately is done with the use of DL
Freight. The average rate of approval of invoice has not been given publicly, but we do know
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from the Walton presentation that if there are no discrepancies, then the invoicing is immediate
[36]. For the sake of argument, let us put the average rate to be 5 minutes even though
unmodified Hyperledger has the capability of close to 100 transactions per second [60]. Another
reason for the 5-minute average is because DLT Labs ensures that all the invoice disputes are
just quickly fixed discrepancies. All the Walmart Freight invoices were paid on time via the
Walmart ERP systems as the Walton Presentations shows that “over payments/delayed payments
were eliminated” [36]. All the invoice disputes dropped from 70% down to around 1.5% [35].
Since all invoices were paid on time (mentioned in this paragraph), that means that there are no
errored invoices post-manual review.

Figure 42. Error Rate (Percentage of Invoices) for each System
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Figure 42, shows us the percentage of Errored Invoices for each System. pre–manual
review, it appears that DL Freight has a higher rate of errors than DEAMS, but for post-manual
review, DL Freight is able to drop the percentage of errors down to 0%.

Figure 43. Latency 1 (Average Time to Process Invoice) for each System
In Graph 43, the average invoice process for both DEAMS and GFEBS are equal, but the
invoices between Walmart and their vendors are nearly instant. DEAMS and GFEBS take 1440
times longer than DL Freight.
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Figure 44. Latency 2 (Percentage of Invoice Paid on Time vs Not Paid on Time) for each
System
In Figure 44, we see each systems invoices ratios between “paid on time” and “not paid
on time”. DEAMS and GFEBS have approximately the same percentage of delayed payments
while DL Freight was able to pay everything on time.
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Performance Summary
Table 5. Summary of Performance Analysis
Metrics

DEAMS

GFEBS

DL Freight

Cost ($USD Billion)

3.4

1.68

1.03

Time (months)

336

93

17

Throughput (# of invoices)

280000

1300000

400000

Error Rate (%)

1.2

7

1.5

Latency 1 (min)

7200

7200

5

Latency 2 (%)

81

79

100

In Table 5, we see the summary of the Performance Analysis for three systems: DEAMS,
GFEBS, and DL Freight. The Performance Analysis includes Cost, Time, Throughput, Error
Rate, Latency. As mentioned previously, we do not know how DL Freight will change in theses
metrics once it is implemented in an DoD environment. Therefore, we will not be comparing the
Performance Metrics in this paper.
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DoD Implemented Permissioned Private Blockchain

Figure 45. Block Definition Diagram of DoD Permissioned Private Blockchain with DoD
systems and Vendor

Figure 46: Internal Block Diagram including Permissioned Private Blockchain
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Figure 47: Internal Block Diagram of DoD Permissioned Private Blockchain

Figures 45-47 display the potential application of a Permissioned Private Blockchain in
the DoD. One disclaimer for these figures is that every branch has their own way of running their
ERP and the replacement of an ERP may differ between military branches. Another disclaimer is
that there may be a lot of different ways of using Permissioned Private Blockchain, from
minimal insertion to complete overhaul. However, Figure 45’s block diagram strikes a balance.
Finally, the last disclaimer is that we will be using Figure 15’s GFEBS Block Diagram as the
baseline for the application of Permissioned Private Blockchain. However, this paper’s goal is
not to replace GFEBS specifically.
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Figure 36 used a majority of the established entities from the GFEBS Block Diagram
(Figure 15). The parts that differ between the block diagrams is the removal of GFEBS and no
longer being reliant on DFAS to pass the information over to the US Treasury to pay the vendor.
In the internal block diagram (Figure 47) for “DoD Permissioned Private Blockchain”, we see all
the parts of the blockchain. Similar process occurs within the GFEBS internal diagram (Figure
17) as the Program Manager’s Requirements are processed by Purchase Requisition Approver,
Purchase Requisition Processor, and Purchase Requisition Funds Certifier. The following step,
the Purchase Request will be sent to the Contracting Office who will find the best vendor for the
job. Once the awarded contract has been set the next steps are where tasks differ from the
original GFEBS version. The Smart Contract (shipment equation that has already been
established) waits for the new Purchase Request that includes the Bill of Lading form the
Contracting Office. The Smart contract is constantly taking “Live IoT Device Data” from the
Vendor’s Freight. This way all variables of the smart contract equation will be calculated for
when the transaction is added to the blockchain. The world state (which includes all accounts’
financial data) is also updated as transactions occur. The Peer Node that houses the Blockchain
and World State emits the transaction such that the client-side application can display the data
such that the Vendor and Contracting Office can see that there is no malice in the transaction.
The Client-Side Application (CSA) is live as the new IoT data keeps updating the smart contract
equation. This cuts down on all the “Payment Certifiers and Processors” and “Good Receipt
Processor” as live transactions are continuously happening. Once live updates are over,
indicating end of delivery, the CSA can format the Ledger to match the USSGL and US Treasury
payment format. Finally, the last step is to pay the vendor via the US Treasury using Electronic
Transfer similar to the GFEBS model.
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A possible alternative could be the US Treasury sending CBDC instead of an Electronic
Funds Transfer to the vendor. This would require the adoption of the Digital Dollar Project and
further research to see if there is a major difference in the process of using CBDC instead of
normal currency.
Summary
From the 10-Step Blockchain Flowchart Analysis, we determined that Permissioned
Private Blockchain would be more ideal than Permissioned Public Blockchain and
Permissionless Public Blockchain. In the same portion of the Analysis, we determined that smart
contracts (a vital part of the Permissioned Private Blockchain) works when the contract can be
broken down to an equation with variables. The variables can be updated live to constantly give
the feedback for how much the vendor is owed at any given time.
In the Regulation portion of the analysis, we figured out that Permissioned Private
Blockchain passed all the rules that are part of the FFMIA and GAAP Principles. In the GAO’s
Weakness portion of the Requirements Matrix, Requirements 4.2.1 and 4.3.1 were unable to be
solved by a potential blockchain system as administrative actions could satisfy those two
requirements. Other than those two requirements, the rest were able to be satisfied by different
parts of the Permissioned Private Blockchain.
The Metrics portion of the Analysis, displayed the Cost, Time, Throughput, Error Rate,
and Latency for the three systems: DEAMS, GFEBS, and DL Freight. A comparison would
between the metrics is not in the scope of this paper. We do not know how DL Freight’s Metrics
will change when it is implemented in a DoD environment.
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The last aspect of the Analysis is the theoretical look at a Permissioned Private
Blockchain (modeled after Walmart Canada’s DL Freight) within the DoD. Figures 45, 46, 47
replace GFEBS and DFAS with the Permissioned Private Blockchain, while connecting to all
other major entities within the DoD. This paper chose to replace GFEBS because the breakdown
of the GFEBS process was already documented in this research, making it easier for the reader to
visualize changes. The replacement could be possible with any of the other DoD ERP (if
necessary and appropriate). The biggest changes of the new process are the removal of “Payment
Certifiers and Processors” and “Good Receipt Processor” as Freights will input smart contract
variables live. The next and final section of this paper is the Conclusion which will summarize
all questions and findings concisely.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction of Research
This chapter will start with reiterating the research question mentioned at the beginning
of this paper. Next, the summary of the analysis shall be discussed. Finally, this chapter will
close with a recommendation of action and further research.
Summary of Research Questions
This research focused on the extent to which blockchain technology can be used by the
DoD to fix weaknesses found in the most recent report of audits. There were four key areas of
weakness in the Information Technology portion of the audit. This paper has answered the three
major questions and few sub questions regarding the current state of the DoD financial system as
well as blockchain solutions.
Summary of Research Answers
What are the drawbacks of the current DoD financial systems?
The drawbacks were highlighted when going over the GAO Weakness portion of the
Methodology and Analysis. To summarize, GAO made a call to action to configure security
management, control access, segregate duties, and decommission legacy systems. Configuring
Security Management includes monitoring changes to avoid unauthorized adjustments. This goes
along with the second weakness, Access Control. This means that users will only have access
based on their authorization level. If users have the right authorization level, then ideally there
would be less unauthorized changes. The next weakness is the Segregating Duties to avoid
conflict of interest. Finally, according to GAO, the Legacy Systems do not do a good job
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capturing transaction details. This in turn forces users of the legacy system to resort to manual
recording which is hard to reproduce when auditing occurs. The goal is to fix all these
weaknesses so that GAO changes the auditing from disclaimer of opinion to clean audit (free
from financial misstatements).
Does blockchain meet all requirements and remediate current drawbacks?
Permissioned Private Blockchain had to satisfy the FFMIA, GAAP Principles and GAO
defined Weaknesses. The requirement matrix, seen in Figure 35, shows which parts of
blockchain satisfies which requirement. The blockchain was able to satisfy all aspects of the
FFMIA and GAAP Principles. When it came to the weakness, the blockchain was not able to
satisfy Requirements 4.2.1 and 4.3.1. These requirements were deemed to be only satisfied via
administrative intervention. Besides those requirements, blockchain was able to satisfy the rest of
GAO defined Weaknesses’ requirements
What are DoD financial regulations and current practices?
The current practices for the DoD, in the most basic manner, are Vendors being awarded
contracts based on the requirements set by Program Managers. The invoices are then sent by the
Vendors once the delivery/service has been done. GFEBS operators will format the invoice one
way to add to the Army General Ledger and another way as Ready-to-Pay File for DFAS. The
Army General Ledger is once again reformatted for the USSGL while the Ready-to-Pay Files is
sent to the US Treasury where an Electronic Payment is made for the Vendor.
The current financial regulations include following the “Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996, federal accounting standards, and USSGL at the transactional level”
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[7]. The FFMIA has 8 requirements. The federal accounting standards closely adheres to the ten
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Finally, the “USSGL at the transactional
level” is similar to one of the FFMIA requirements.
What type of blockchain are most appropriate for current DoD practices? And why?
From the 10-Step Blockchain Flowchart, we determined that a Permissioned Private
Blockchain would suit the DOD or any government agency the best. This decision was made
over the other two popular choices for blockchain: Permissionless Public Blockchain and
Permissioned Private Blockchain. It was easy to dismiss Permissionless Public Blockchain as
this type of ledger would let anyone, including foreign adversaries join, read, and write on the
same ledger that the DOD and its vendors/contractors would be using. The transactions would
also be made public jeopardizing the integrity and confidentiality of military transactions. The
reason that Permissioned Private Blockchain was chosen over Permissioned Public Blockchain is
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Exemption 4 which states that trade secrets and
financial information between contractor and government agency can be made confidential.
Contractors and vendors won’t be willing to join a blockchain network where all their financial
information can be read by competing contractors and vendors. This is the current (no
blockchain) state of contractor/government agency relationship. In order to continue this
relationship, Permissioned Private Blockchain uses Channels. These Channels allow Contractor
X to do business with the DOD without even knowing the transaction happening between
Contract Y and the DOD (and vice-versa). Each relationship is done on different channels
recreating the same environment found in the current (no blockchain) system.
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What type of transactions within the DoD can blockchain optimize?
The smart contract within all blockchains sets the rules in code where both parties agree
to beforehand and adhere to at all times. Smart contract is formulaic with the use of variables
(known and/or live). DL Freight, Walmart Canada’s full production blockchain system, uses IoT
devices within the freight trucks to send live information about temperature, GPS, etc. This
information can be added on the known/consistent data (such as shipment details) to be variables
where the smart contract formula produces an invoice in real time. Contract disputes like the F35 Primer situation would not be resolved with smart contracts because putting primer on the
plane cannot be broken down into a formula with variables.
What current systems/policies would need to change to accommodate a blockchain solution?
With the use of Permissioned Private Blockchain in the DoD, some parts of the GFEBS
are either removed or reworked (Figures 45, 46, 47). This paper uses GFEBS as a choice of
replacement, because the GFEBS process is already documented in the Literature Review
making it easier for readers to follow along. The new process will see the elimination of
“Payment Certifiers and Processors” and “Good Receipt Processor” as Freights as live IoT data
will come from Freights to populate the smart contract’s variables. If the DoD is keen on a
blockchain solution, then contracts would need to be formulaic such that it can be the smart
contract. However, if a contract cannot be broken down into variables, then the DoD would still
need the current process to work these types of non-formulaic contracts.
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What are some challenges the DoD could face if they were to transition to a blockchain
based solution?
Yes, this blockchain can be used to track government transactions, in certain cases. This
will be fleshed out in the next couple paragraphs. The incorporation of 10-Step Blockchain
Flowchart, Regulation and Weaknesses Analysis, and Performance Metrics has led to the
realization that blockchain is a solution for DOD auditing problems.

What metrics can be used to compare DoD financial systems with a possible
blockchain solution
The systems chosen for comparison were: DEAMS, GFEBS, and Walmart Canada’s DL
Freight. DEAMS was chosen as this was the system with the most up to date data since it is
currently still in progress. GFEBS was chosen as it is an already established DoD ERP that has a
lot of publicly available data. Finally, DL Freight was chosen because it is an already established
Permissioned Private Blockchain which could be replicated within the DoD.
The metrics this paper uses are: Cost, Time, Throughput, Error Rate and Latency. Cost
Metrics observes the Lifecyle Cost for each of three systems. The Time Metrics uses the full
development timeline for each system and converts into months. The Throughput Metric
displays the number of invoices process annually by each system. The Error Rate is the
percentage of incorrect invoices. DL Freight will have two parts: pre-manual review and postmanual review. Pre-manual review is only the blockchain running while the post-manual review
takes a lot at the errors and corrects them. The Latency is divided into two parts: Average Time
to Process Invoice and Percentage of Invoice Paid on Time. This way we can see how fast
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Invoices are paid off and if they are paid within their respective deadlines. Table 5 shows more
details of all the Metrics for each system.
Study Limitations
This study was limited by lack of data, difficulty to access data, and possible exaggerated
data. There were many instances where only old versions of the data/model exist and newer
models have been mentioned, but no data/model to back up the claim. Since this thesis covers the
financial aspects of the DOD and vendors, many of such financial statistics will not show up as
unclassified which makes it hard to get to. Another way data is difficult to access is when it is
hidden behind a private company. Companies only will show the barebones of financial data for
their investors, so it is hard to get a breakdown of certain expenses and profits. Private
companies also may use Public Relation (PR) tricks to embellish accomplishment while
downplaying failures. These companies may not report everything they have tried, so trying to
find where private blockchain was unsuccessful was difficult to find. Companies only like to
show off when they have done something to get a return on investment.

Recommendations for Action (if applicable)
Simplify DOD contracts
Government agencies, within the DOD, handle many different types of contracts. The
call for action is to find out what DOD contracts can be simplified to variables in formulas.
Similar to the DL Freight breaking down freight logistics to formulas, the DOD can do the same
with its own freight logistics. Handling large scale inventory could be simplified into formulas
that include IoT.
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Decide between COTS or In-House Implementation
The implementation of IoT devices connecting to a Private Blockchain has already been
established in private industry. This is done by blockchain development companies whose sole
job is to tailor fit the blockchain to an already existing system. There are talented coders within
the DOD, but not many will be experienced in coding in blockchain programming languages.
The recommendation is to conduct a tradeoff analysis between blockchain developer company
and DOD blockchain team to determine which group can implement a Private Blockchain.
Recommendations for Future Research
A comptroller or other high financial entity within a DOD agency conducts a formal
inquiry of all the same metrics to obtain reliable first-hand (classified) data. All data obtained in
this paper was unclassified, so there could be data omitted due to its classified nature. The need
for a different point of view would also be of benefit because these are the same people that
would be using a potential blockchain solution. Another possible future research would involve
using the metrics outline in this paper and comparing DEAMS and GFEBS against DL Freight.
Ideally the more DoD ERP used, the better the results would turn out.
Significance of Research
This section answered all aspects of the research question, which yielded that Private
Permissioned Blockchain can be used by the government in certain transactions. It also made a
call to action to simplify DoD contracts into formulas and conduct a tradeoff analysis between a
COTS or in-house blockchain solution. The future research portion discussed the need for a
different point of view and more firsthand data. The purpose of this paper is to better prepare the
DOD to pass an audit. The process of a traceable ledger would greatly help the auditing team
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track transactions. The combination of smart contracts and IoT can slim down on the amount of
invoice discrepancies and delays.
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